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PROPERTY LAW—TAX INCREMENT FINANCING—A CASE FOR BRINGING
TIF BACK TO THE STATE OF ARKANSAS
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2017, garnering massive publicity, Amazon.com, Inc. (“Amazon”)
announced that it would begin searching for a site for a second headquarters
it called “HQ2.”1 Cities across the country immediately clamored for the
attention of the technology giant and Amazon received two hundred and
thirty-eight bids by October of the same year.2 Amazon listed a number of
requirements applicant-cities would have to meet, as well as a number of
“preferences” the company would take into account in choosing a site.3 One
of these “Key Preferences and Decision Drivers” was that the new site be
located somewhere with “[a] stable and business-friendly environment and
tax structure.”4 “Incentives offered . . . to offset initial capital outlay and
ongoing operational costs” were said to be “significant factors in the decision-making process.”5 In exchange for such incentives, Amazon promised
“as many as fifty thousand new full-time employees with an average annual
total compensation exceeding one hundred thousand dollars” and over five
billion dollars in capital expenditures.6
Amazon eventually whittled the two hundred and thirty-eight bids
down to two (New York and Virginia) and, while negotiations have broken
down with the former,7 at one point the company stood to recover over three
billion dollars in tax breaks and incentives.8 In Virginia, it has been reported
that almost half of Amazon’s total incentive package came in the form of
government aid for infrastructure needs and property improvements. 9 While
there were plenty of people in New York and Virginia outraged by the
1. Chloe Foussianes, A Timeline of Amazon’s “HQ2,” from the First Announcement to
a Failed Campus in New York City, TOWN & COUNTRY (Feb. 14, 2019),
https://www.townandcountrymag.com/society/money-and-power/a26345749/amazon-hq2new-york-city-timeline/.
2. Id.
3. Id.; Amazon HQ2 RFP, AMAZON 5, https://images-na.ssl-images-amazon.com/
images/G/01/Anything/test/images/usa/RFP_3._V516043504_.pdf (last visited Dec. 7, 2019).
4. Amazon HQ2 RFP, supra note 3 at 5.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1.
7. Foussianes, supra note 1.
8. Arjun Panchadar, Factbox: Amazon to Get Billions in Breaks for HQ2 Development,
REUTERS (Nov. 13, 2018, 1:40 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-amazon-comheadquarters-factbox/amazon-to-get-billions-in-breaks-for-hq2-developmentidUSKCN1NI2KR.
9. Id.
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deals,10 it should come as no surprise that Amazon leveraged offers in an
effort to save money. Yes, it is a billion-dollar company, but it is still a
company.
As evidenced by the Amazon story, a company’s real estate needs often
make up one of the biggest puzzle pieces in any business venture, and costsaving with respect to real estate can play a huge role in where (or if) a
business relocates. However, this tactic is not limited only to the business
world. Complex real estate transactions also play an important role in the
economic development plans of communities across the country. The twohundred and thirty-eight cities that submitted bids to Amazon had job creation and economic stimulus in mind. Perhaps many of them saw an opportunity to invest in parts of their cities that they themselves could not afford
to invest in. What is the harm in giving Amazon a discount if it will invest
some of its billions in those areas? These mutual needs (those of the private
business and those of the public entity) are what often lead to incentive
packages like those offered to Amazon.
While Arkansas has made it abundantly clear that it was never going to
(nor could it ever) court Amazon with such lavish incentives,11 the reality is
that the state must offer some sort of assistance for complex real estate
transactions if it wants to foster economic development and become a national competitor. Government assistance becomes even more important in
light of the overall business climate in Arkansas. A recent study ranked Arkansas in the bottom ten for “business friendliness” in the entire country.12
This is not to say that businesses have zero government assistance available
in Arkansas. The state offers a number of incentives, mostly in the form of
tax credits and cash rebates based on a business’s job creation capability,13
but Arkansas lags far behind many other states in this area, particularly in
the area of complex real estate transactions.
The climate for economic development in Arkansas, within the context
of real estate transactions, was not always so dismal. Arkansas enjoyed
roughly seven years of sensible, business-friendly economic policy from
2000 to 2007 in the form of tax increment financing.14 In its most basic definition, tax increment financing (TIF) allows a local government to capture a
10. Foussianes, supra note 1.
11. Max Brantley, LR Told D.C. Before It Told City Residents It Wasn’t Going After
Amazon, ARK. TIMES: ARK. BLOG (Oct. 19, 2017, 10:18 AM), https://www.arktimes.com/
ArkansasBlog/archives/2017/10/19/lr-told-dc-before-it-told-city-residents.
12. Top States for Business: 40. Arkansas, CNBC (July 10, 2018, 8:30 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/10/top-states-for-business-arkansas.html.
13. Job Creation Incentives in Arkansas, ARK. ECON. DEV. COMMISSION,
https://www.arkansasedc.com/why-arkansas/business-climate/incentives/pages/job-creationincentives (last visited Dec. 7, 2019).
14. See infra Section III.
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portion of an area’s property taxes for a period of time and to make the revenue produced by that captured portion available to finance the development
of the property from which the tax revenue was captured.15 TIF is at once a
way for businesses to mitigate the costs of satisfying their real estate needs
and a way for local governments to revive parts of their towns and cities
without shouldering the entire financial burden.
Unfortunately, TIF’s tenure in the Natural State was relatively short
lived. In City of Fayetteville v. Washington County, the Arkansas Supreme
Court issued a ruling that effectively gutted TIF and left businesses and local governments with one less tool for redeveloping property.16 The case
marked a step in the wrong direction for Arkansas economic growth, resulting in the need for TIF to be revitalized in a major way, either by overturning City of Fayetteville17 or by amending the Arkansas Constitution.18
Part II of this note will provide an overview of TIF basics as well as a
brief history of TIF across the country. Part III will examine TIF in Arkansas, taking a close look at Arkansas’s TIF statutes, offering a typical TIF
example, and surveying TIF criticisms. Part IV highlights the main sources
of contention over TIF. Part V focuses primarily on the City of Fayetteville
opinion itself, providing the facts and procedural history leading up to the
case as well as revisiting the current state of TIF in light of the court’s decision. Finally, Part VI offers two ways that TIF could be renewed in Arkansas. First, arguing that City of Fayetteville was decided incorrectly, Part VI
will show that TIF can be revitalized by overturning the case either completely or partially. Next, Part VI presents a plan for amending the Arkansas
Constitution that includes (1) borrowing from previous efforts of the Arkansas legislature and (2) incorporating provisions from the American Planning
Association’s model TIF statutes.
II. WHAT IS TIF?
This section introduces a number of key concepts and definitions that
will be important going forward and provides an overview of the typical TIF
processes. Although this section covers concepts that are common to all
states, definitions vary from state to state. Therefore, where possible, Arkansas-specific definitions are interspersed to avoid confusion in subsequent
sections. This section will also briefly cover the history of TIF in the United
States, providing a general idea of the policy underpinnings for the financing method.
15. 6 ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 33B.01 (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. 2020);
see infra Section II.A.
16. See City of Fayetteville v. Washington Cty., 369 Ark. 455, 255 S.W.3d 844 (2007).
17. See infra Section VI.A.
18. See infra Section VI.B.
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The Basics: Typical TIF Statutes and Procedures

A survey of the language used in typical TIF scenarios is necessary in
order to follow the often convoluted TIF procedure without confusion. First,
the area in which TIF is used is usually referred to as the “redevelopment
area” or “redevelopment district.”19 The “redevelopment plan” or “project
plan” refers to the actual undertaking that the local governing body and the
property developer intend to carry out.20
TIF concepts are usually broken down in terms of pre-redevelopment
and post-redevelopment. With regard to the former, the property tax revenue
that all the property within a redevelopment area produces prior to any approval of a redevelopment plan is often called the “base revenue.”21 The
base revenue is found by applying the property tax rate of the area to the
“base value,” the assessed value of all the property within the redevelopment district prior to any approval of a project plan.22
The property tax revenue that all the property within a redevelopment
area produces after the approval of a redevelopment plan is called the “current revenue.”23 The current revenue is found by applying the property tax
rate of the area to the “current value,” the assessed value of all the property
within the redevelopment district after the approval of the redevelopment
plan.24
One of the most crucial concepts to grasp is that of the “increment.”
TIF statutes often apply the term “increment” in more than one context,
leading to confusion. First, the term “incremental value” refers to the difference between the base value and the current value.25 Applying the property
tax rate of the redevelopment district to the incremental value yields the “tax
increment.”26 Put another way, the tax increment is the difference between
the base revenue and the current revenue.27
While the exact procedure varies from state to state, the TIF process
usually begins with a public entity (often called the “redevelopment authority”) submitting a project plan to a local governing body (usually a city).28

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS, supra note 15.
Id.
Id.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-168-301(2) (2018).
ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS, supra note 15.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-168-301(5) (2018).
Id. § 14-168-301(7)(A) (2018).
Id. § 14-168-301(16) (2018).
ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS, supra note 15.
Id.
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There is variation among the states as to whether an independent authority
must initiate the TIF process29 or whether a city can do so unilaterally.30
Once a redevelopment project is approved and the redevelopment district is established, the tax increment produced by the district is usually deposited into a fund that is kept separate from the general revenue fund.31
This separate “special fund” is then used to pay costs associated with the
redevelopment project.32 The special fund may be used for direct payment of
project expenses, but typically the city will use the tax increment to take out
a loan or issue bonds.33
TIF concepts are easier to grasp by way of example. Consider the following scenario:
[A] [local governing body] has adopted tax increment financing with respect to a redevelopment area. Prior to redevelopment, the assessments
in the area produced $1,000,000 in real property tax revenue [the base
revenue]. After redevelopment, the assessments will produce $3,500,000
in tax revenue [the current revenue]. The difference between the base
revenue of $1,000,000 and the current revenue of $3,500,000
($2,500,000) is the tax increment revenue. 34

B.

A Brief History of TIF

TIF has been in use across the United States for nearly seventy years as
a means of incentivizing private investment in economically depressed areas.35 The practice originated in California, but after the federal government
made large cuts to state redevelopment funds in the 1960s, the rest of the
country followed suit.36 In light of the increased volatility of federal funding
in the late 1960s and 1970s, states began embracing TIF as a local alternative to federal governmental assistance.37 Not only does TIF insulate local
redevelopment efforts from federal (and state) cutbacks, but TIF is also valued because:
[I]t raises revenue without increasing the rate of taxation; it offers flexibility . . . both as to the types of projects financed and the ways in which
those projects are financed; . . . and because it imposes no new taxes, the
29.
2018).
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 11, § 38-120 (Westlaw through Second Reg. Sess. of
See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 1892 (Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.).
ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS, supra note 15.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-168-301(15) (2018).
ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS, supra note 15.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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debt incurred by tax increment financing is not a general obligation of
the local government . . . .38

III. TIF IN ARKANSAS
This section begins with an introduction and brief overview of Arkansas property taxes before discussing the specifics of the Arkansas TIF statutes. This section also presents an Arkansas-specific example, incorporating
the TIF concepts and definitions discussed thus far. Finally, this section will
consider the praises and criticisms of TIF both in Arkansas and nationwide.
A.

Arkansas Property Taxes

In order to properly understand Arkansas TIF, a brief discussion about
Arkansas property tax calculation is necessary. In Arkansas, property (or
“ad valorem”) taxes are levied by local governing bodies as opposed to the
state.39 The property tax rate is expressed in terms of “mills” or a “millage
rate,” with one mill being equal to $0.001.40 The millage rate is applied to
the assessed value of certain real property to calculate the tax revenue collected from that property annually.41 For example, real property with an assessed value of $1,000,000 in an area with a millage rate of fifty (or, put
another way, with fifty mills levied against it) would yield $50,000 annually.42 The millage rate or number of mills (fifty) is multiplied by $0.001 and
the assessed value ($1,000,000) is multiplied by that number ($0.05) to determine the annual property tax revenue ($50,000). Typically, local “taxing
units” such as school districts and public libraries derive some portion of
their funding from annual property tax revenues.43
B.

Arkansas TIF Statutes and Their Key Provisions

TIF made its debut in Arkansas in 1999 when the 82nd General Assembly introduced H.J.R. 1012, a proposed amendment to the Arkansas
Constitution to, in part, “authorize cities and counties to form redevelopment districts and to issue bonds for redevelopment projects in the district.”44 The people of Arkansas approved H.J.R. 1012 in the form of
38. Id.
39. ARK. CONST. amend. XLVII.
40. Jerald “Cliff” McKinney, Complex Commercial Real Estate Transactions in Arkansas; Or a Grammatically Incorrect Tour of Real Estate Transactions in Arkansas 68 (August
2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § 3.
44. H.J. Res. 1012, 82d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 1999).
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Amendment 78 in the regular election on November 7, 2000.45 Amendment
78, the purpose of which was to inhibit the spread of blight and increase
economic development within the redevelopment districts,46 was structured
in a similar fashion as TIF amendments in other states. It authorized a city or
county to form a redevelopment district and authorized that city or county to
issue bonds to secure financing for improvements within the district, those
bonds secured and payable by “all or part of the ad valorem taxes levied
against any increase in the assessed value of property” in the district.47 Notably, Amendment 78 also contained a general “repealer” clause, stating that
any part of the Constitution in conflict with the amendment “is repealed
insofar as it is in conflict with [Amendment 78].”48
Act 1197 implemented Amendment 78 in 2001.49 Act 1197, as codified
in Title 14 of the Arkansas Code, established the procedure for forming a
redevelopment district and approving a project plan and it conferred broad
powers on local governing bodies in doing so.50 Importantly, under Act
1197, the term “taxing unit” (those entities that derive at least part of their
funding from property tax revenue) included cities, counties, school districts, and community college districts.51 Another key provision of Act 1197
excluded from Amendment 78 any mills already dedicated to libraries, fire
and police pension funds, and county hospitals.52
The definitions within the Arkansas TIF statutes vary slightly from
those outlined above and it is important to understand them going forward.
First, the “total ad valorem rate” is defined as “the total millage rate of all
state, county, city, school, or other property taxes levied on all taxable property within a redevelopment district in a year.”53 In the previous example,54
fifty mills would be the “total ad valorem rate.” The “debt service ad valorem rate” means any portion of the total ad valorem rate that is already
pledged to the payment of the debts of any taxing unit within the redevelopment district when the district is formed.55 For example, any mills dedi45. Christian Harris, Survey of Legislation, Constitutional Amendments, 24 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 635, 635 (2002).
46. ARK. CONST. amend. LXXVIII, § 1(c).
47. Id. § 1(a)–(b), (d).
48. Id. § 1(f).
49. Arkansas Community Redevelopment Act of 2001, No. 1197, 2001 Ark. Acts 1197
(codified as amended at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 14-168-301 to -324 (2018)).
50. ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-168-305(a) (“The local governing body, upon its own initiative, . . . may designate the boundaries of a proposed redevelopment district.” (emphasis
added)).
51. See Arkansas Community Redevelopment Act, supra note 49 at § 2(16).
52. ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-168-301(18)(b).
53. Id. § 14-168-301(18)(A).
54. McKinney, supra note 40.
55. ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-168-301(6).
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cated to libraries or county hospitals (and therefore excluded from TIF)
could be considered part of the debt service ad valorem rate. The “applicable
ad valorem rate” is the difference between the total ad valorem rate and the
debt service ad valorem rate.56 In Arkansas, it is the applicable ad valorem
rate that is applied to the incremental value of a redevelopment district to
determine the tax increment.57
C.

An Arkansas Example

With this knowledge of Arkansas property tax calculation and TIF definitions in mind, another example of the TIF procedure is pertinent. For the
sake of uniformity, the figures from the previous example will be recycled.
As a refresher, the total ad valorem rate of the hypothetical redevelopment
district is fifty mills and the base value of the district is $1,000,000.58 This
means the proposed district produces a base revenue of $50,000 annually. 59
Now assume that, after a city establishes the redevelopment district, the projected current value of the property becomes $10,000,000.60 Applying the
total ad valorem rate of fifty mills to this current value yields $500,000, the
current revenue, making the increment $450,000 ($500,000-$50,000).61 The
same value can be calculated by applying the total ad valorem rate (fifty
mills) to the incremental value of the property ($9,000,000).
Assume that this hypothetical redevelopment district has already
pledged twenty mills to libraries and county hospitals when the district is
formed (the debt service ad valorem rate). This yields an applicable ad valorem rate of thirty mills (fifty mills less twenty mills) for the district. The
applicable ad valorem rate (thirty mills) would be applied to the increment
($450,000) to get $13,500.62 This annual return of $13,500 would then be
deposited into the “special fund” and made available to the city to finance
the redevelopment project.63
D.

Criticisms

Despite the many advantages of TIF, the practice has not been without
its critics. At their most benign, these critics are skeptical of TIF’s ability to
actually foster new development, as opposed to shifting it from one commu56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. § 14-168-301(1).
Id. § 14-168-301(16).
McKinney, supra note 40.
Id.
Id. at 69.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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nity to another.64 At their most hostile, these critics regard TIF as a tool for
evil capitalists to divert money away from the public good.65 The chief concern of TIF opponents typically manifests itself in the form of some “government handout” or “government welfare” argument. As recently as 2015,
media outlets have labeled efforts to get redevelopment districts off the
ground again in Arkansas as “crony capitalism.”66 Others call TIF a “developer scam rammed through a compliant legislature that has fallen short of
the miracles predicted.”67
IV. CONFUSION OVER TIF
As is the case with many heated debates revolving around publicprivate business interactions, much of the TIF criticism can be explained by
misunderstanding. Part IV considers one of the primary reasons for this misunderstanding. This section discusses Amendment 78’s relationship with
another seemingly conflicting amendment and the efforts previous Arkansas
officials have made to reconcile that conflict.
A.

Amendment 74

Amendment 74, approved by Arkansas voters in the 1996 general election, established a uniform property tax rate of twenty-five mills to be levied
on all real property in the state for school maintenance and operation.68
Amendment 74 provided that the tax revenue was to be collected by the
state and distributed to the school districts.69 Additionally, the amendment
empowered the state legislature to propose increases and decreases to the
uniform rate, with those proposals to be voted on in the general election.70
Amendment 74 did not limit school districts to twenty-five mills, rather,
twenty-five mills became the floor and individual school districts could vote
to impose an additional property tax on top of that.71

64. See Penelope Lemov, Tough Times for TIFs?, GOVERNING (Sept. 16, 2010, 3:00
AM), http://www.governing.com/topics/finance/tough-times-tax-increment-financing.html.
65. See Crony Capitalism in Arkansas – HB 1410, CONDUIT FOR ACTION (Mar. 5, 2015),
https://www.conduitforaction.org/crony-capitalism-in-arkansas-hb1410/.
66. Id.
67. Max Brantley, Those Miraculous TIF Districts, ARK. TIMES: ARK. BLOG (Sept. 5,
2011, 6:54 AM), https://www.arktimes.com/ArkansasBlog/archives/2011/09/05/thosemiraculous-tif-districts.
68. ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § 3(b)(1).
69. Id. § 3(b)(3).
70. Id. § 3(b)(4).
71. Id. § 3(c)(1).
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Searching for Guidance

Soon after Amendment 78 was implemented, questions arose concerning whether any portion of Amendment 74’s mills could be used by a redevelopment district.72 The language of Amendment 78 (particularly before
Act 2231, discussed below) and Amendment 74 made the answer unclear.
While Amendment 78 (and its implementing legislation) expressly excluded
mills pledged to the service of debt that pre-dates a redevelopment district,
as well as the mills pledged to pension funds, libraries, and county hospitals,73 it makes no mention of Amendment 74’s uniform rate.
At least two Arkansas attorneys general were asked to issue some
guidance on the subject between 2001 and 2005.74 In December of 2001,
three state senators requested an opinion “concerning the relationship between Amendments 74 and 78” from then-Attorney General Mark Pryor.75
While Pryor found the answer to be “not entirely clear,”76 he did offer at
least two feasible arguments. First, the twenty-five mills imposed by
Amendment 74 could potentially be considered a property tax “levied by the
state itself” because Amendment 74 was approved by the people of Arkansas.77 If this were the case, it could be argued that Amendment 74’s mills
would be shielded from Amendment 78’s reach. The Attorney General
wrote his opinion at a time when, under Act 1197, “the State” was not included in the definition of a “taxing unit.”78 Therefore, the uniform rate imposed by Amendment 74, levied by an entity outside of Act 1197’s “taxing
unit” definition, would not be available under section 1(d) of Amendment
78.79
Second, continuing with his analysis of the “taxing unit” definition under Act 1197, the Attorney General noted that if Amendment 74’s uniform
rate was not considered a tax imposed by the state, then it would have to be
a tax imposed by a school district.80 School districts were expressly considered “taxing units” under Act 1197,81 and the Arkansas Supreme Court had
construed the phrase to include school districts.82 Therefore, in the Attorney
General’s opinion, Amendment 78 “clearly authorizes the diversion of some
72. See Op. Ark. Att’y Gen. No. 295 (2001).
73. ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-168-301(18)(b).
74. See Op. Ark. Att’y Gen. No. 359 (2005); Op. Ark. Att’y Gen. No. 295 (2001).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Arkansas Community Redevelopment Act of 2001, No. 1197, 2001 Ark. Acts 1197
(codified as amended at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 14-168-301 to -324 (2018)).
79. ARK. CONST. amend. LXXVIII, § 1(d).
80. Op. Ark. Att’y Gen. No. 295 (2001).
81. ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-168-301(16).
82. See Frank v. Barker, 341 Ark. 566, 582, 20 S.W.3d 293, 296 (2000).
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school tax revenues to support redevelopment districts.”83 Pryor’s opinion
set out these two possible arguments (as well as a discussion about Amendment 78’s “repealer” clause84), but no definitive answer revealed itself.
However, the opinion did note that, should Amendment 74 be considered a
state-imposed tax, Amendment 78 vested the General Assembly with the
ability to “amend the statutory scheme to clarify the matter as it sees fit.”85
In other words, according to Pryor, the General Assembly could simply pass
legislation to include “the State” in the definition of “taxing unit” under Act
1197.
Apparently, Pryor’s opinion was of little help and may have created
even more confusion in its wake, for a little over three years later one of the
same senators that wrote to Pryor wrote to Pryor’s successor requesting an
answer to the exact same question.86 Pryor’s successor, Mike Beebe, raised
several of the same arguments in his opinion. However, in Beebe’s opinion,
the twenty-five mills imposed by Amendment 74 was indeed a state tax.87
Therefore, in Beebe’s opinion, because Act 1197 did not include the state as
a “taxing unit,” redevelopment districts could not redirect any revenue attributed to Amendment 74’s uniform rate to the redevelopment project. 88
Beebe’s opinion also discussed the possibility that the legislature could
amend Amendment 78’s enabling legislation to include “the State” in the
“taxing unit” definition, but, as did Mark Pryor, Beebe opined that doing so
might raise issues of constitutionality.89
Three months after Attorney General Beebe’s slightly more definitive
opinion, the General Assembly introduced House Bill 2735 for the main
purpose of clarifying the definition of “taxing unit” under Act 1197.90 Act
2231 enacted the bill on April 15, 2005.91 Act 2231 made numerous changes
to Act 1197,92 but it mainly operated to include “the State of Arkansas” in
the definition of “taxing unit.”93

83. Op. Ark. Att’y Gen. No. 295 (2001).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See Op. Ark. Att’y Gen. No. 359 (2005).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. H.B. 2735, 85th Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2005).
91. Act of Apr. 15, 2005, No. 2231, 2005 Ark. Acts 2231 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN.
§§ 14-168-301 to -324 (2018)).
92. See infra Part VI.B.1.
93. ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-168-301(16).
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V. CITY OF FAYETTEVILLE V. WASHINGTON COUNTY
This section introduces the Arkansas Supreme Court case that drastically altered TIF, highlighting the facts and procedural history of the case
before discussing the Supreme Court’s opinion. This section will also discuss the current state of TIF in Arkansas, providing an example of how TIF
operates after the City of Fayetteville decision.
A.

City versus County: Facts and Procedural History

Only one month after the Arkansas legislature enacted Act 2231,
Amendment 78 was put to the test. From March 16, 2005 to April 26, 2007,
a test case moved through the Arkansas court system challenging the extent
of Amendment 78’s reach.94 On December 28, 2004, the City of Fayetteville, Arkansas (“the City”) formed and approved the plan for the Highway
71 East Square Redevelopment District Number One (“the Highway 71 District”).95 The Washington County Assessor (“the Assessor”), pursuant to the
Arkansas TIF statutes,96 determined and certified the total ad valorem rate,
debt service ad valorem rate, and applicable ad valorem rate for the Highway 71 District on January 24, 2005.97 In March of 2005, the Fayetteville
City Council passed an ordinance for the issuance of bonds to cover the cost
of the project plan.98 On March 16, 2005, the City filed a complaint against
Washington County, the Assessor, and the Fayetteville School District (“the
School), as well as the Fayetteville Public Library and the boards of trustees
for the police and firemen’s pension funds.99 The complaint alleged, in relevant part, that the Assessor’s ad valorem rate certifications were incorrect
and that the rates should have included the twenty-five mills that Amendment 74 requires Washington County to levy on behalf of the School.100 The
City’s complaint requested a declaratory judgment as to what the proper
94. See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Mandatory Injunction, City of Fayetteville v. Washington Cty., 369 Ark. 455, 255 S.W.3d 844 (2007) (No. CIV 05-559-2), 2005
WL 5524744 [hereinafter Complaint].
95. Id. para. 15.
96. ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-168-306(b)(5).
97. See Complaint, supra note 94, para. 20.
98. Id. para. 19.
99. Id. para. 1–5.
100. Id. para. 22; see also Brief Amicus Curiae the Arkansas Municipal League in Support of Appellant’s Abstract and Brief at 1–2, City of Fayetteville v. Washington Cty., 369
Ark. 455, 255 S.W.3d 844 (2007) (Nos. 06-602, 02-177), 2006 WL 4540941 (“The Washington County Assessor certified the Total Ad Valorem Rate at 26.86 mills, the Debt Service Ad
Valorem Rate at 23.7 mills, and the Applicable Ad Valorem Rate at 3.16 mills. The certification did not include in its calculations the 25 mills levied by the Fayetteville School District
pursuant to Arkansas Constitutional Amendment 74.”).
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applicable ad valorem rate should have been.101 The Washington County
Circuit Court sided with the defendants, finding the Assessor’s certifications
correct and that Amendment 74’s uniform rate could not be diverted to a
redevelopment district under Amendment 78.102
The City appealed the circuit court’s order to the Arkansas Supreme
Court, arguing that Amendment 78 “worked a slight modification” to
Amendment 74 to allow a redevelopment district to utilize the twenty-five
mills only as to any increase in the assessed value of the property after the
district is established.103 On appeal, the City pointed to Amendment 78’s
failure to mention Amendment 74’s uniform rate, the importance of the
twenty-five mills for the financial viability of TIF, and the subsequent passage of Act 2231 (adding “the State of Arkansas” as a “taxing unit”) as indicators that the legislature intended for Amendment 78 to be able to utilize
Amendment 74’s uniform rate.104
B.

The Opinion

Taking up the issue of the supposed conflict between Amendments 74
and 78, the Arkansas Supreme Court (“the Court”) focused most on what the
drafters of Amendment 78 omitted from the text.105 The Court reasoned that,
because Amendment 78 expressly excepts certain mills (those making up
the debt service ad valorem rate), the drafters could have easily provided for
the inclusion of Amendment 74’s twenty-five mills.106 According to the
Court, the drafters’ failure to do so showed that the drafters did not intend to
repeal, or even modify, Amendment 74.107
Having supplied the drafters’ intent, the Court next determined that this
was not a case of “repeal by implication.”108 Repeal by implication occurs
when two statutes (or a constitutional amendment, for present purposes)
cannot coincide with one another.109 Given their strong disfavor, the bar for
repeals by implication is high and they are only allowed “when there is such
an invincible repugnancy between the provisions that both cannot stand.”110
101. See Complaint, supra note 94, para. 26.
102. See Letter Opinion, City of Fayetteville v. Washington Cty., 369 Ark. 455, 255
S.W.3d 844 (2007) (No. CV 2005-559-2), 2006 WL 4556782.
103. City of Fayetteville’s Abstract, Appellant Brief, and Addendum, City of Fayetteville
v. Washington Cty., 369 Ark. 455, 255 S.W.3d 844 (2007) (No. CV 2005-559-2), 2006 WL
4540936.
104. Id.
105. City of Fayetteville, 369 Ark. at 470, 255 S.W.3d at 855.
106. Id. at 470, 255 S.W.3d at 855.
107. Id. at 470, 255 S.W.3d at 855.
108. Id. at 471, 255 S.W.3d at 856.
109. Doe v. Baum, 348 Ark. 259, 274–75, 72 S.W.3d 476, 484–85 (2002).
110. Id. at 275, 72 S.W.3d at 485.
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Amendments that contain general “repealer” clauses (such as Amendment
78111) are examined under this same “invincible repugnancy” framework. 112
Because the Court found that the intents behind Amendments 74 and 78
were not conflicting, it held that no “invincible repugnancy” existed between the two and that Amendment 74 was not repealed.113
The crux of the Court’s holding in City of Fayetteville was that the Arkansas voters, in approving Amendment 78, “were never put on notice that
Amendment 78 would effectively undo Amendment 74 by funding redevelopment projects with a portion of the uniform rate of twenty-five mills that
had previously been designated solely for the maintenance and operation of
the public schools.”114 The Court noted that the voters approved Amendment
74 just four years before approving Amendment 78 and that Amendment
78’s approval came amidst a backdrop of school funding constitutionality
questions.115 The Court reasoned that Arkansas voters would not have approved Amendment 78 if they knew it would divert school funding to redevelopment projects.116 Thus, the Court affirmed the decision of the circuit
court, concluding that Amendment 74’s uniform rate could not be touched
by TIF.117
C.

TIF After City of Fayetteville

The impact that City of Fayetteville had on TIF can be difficult to grasp
at first. Essentially, the Court’s holding excluded the first twenty-five mills
from the applicable ad valorem rate.118 Consider the previous example. Before City of Fayetteville, the hypothetical redevelopment district produced
$13,500 annually for the city’s financing needs.119 After City of Fayetteville,
another twenty-five mills must be subtracted from the applicable ad valorem
rate, leaving the district with only five mills (thirty mills less twenty-five
mills).120 With only five mills remaining, the same redevelopment district
would only produce $2,250 annually: a sixth of what it previously produced.121 In this scenario, most cities would not even bother to pursue TIF in

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

ARK. CONST. amend. LXXVIII, § 1(f).
City of Fayetteville, 369 Ark. at 470–71, 255 S.W.3d at 855.
Id. at 471, 255 S.W.3d at 856.
Id. at 469–70, 255 S.W.3d at 854.
Id. at 471, 255 S.W.3d at 855–56.
Id. at 471, 255 S.W.3d at 855–56.
Id. at 472, 255 S.W.3d at 856.
McKinney supra note 40, at 69.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the first place, as the annual revenue would almost certainly be insufficient
to service any debt or borrow money.122
VI. REVITALIZING TIF IN ARKANSAS
TIF financing remains effectively useless in Arkansas following the
Supreme Court’s decision in City of Fayetteville. A once-valuable tool for
developers and cities that cannot shoulder the entire cost of redevelopment
has been neutralized. However, there may be hope for TIF yet.
To foster economic growth and development in Arkansas, TIF must be
revitalized in a major way. This section considers two ways that can be accomplished. The first would involve overturning the City of Fayetteville
decision. The second would involve presenting a new TIF amendment to the
Arkansas voters.
A.

Overturning City of Fayetteville

This section begins with an analysis of the City of Fayetteville decision,
arguing that the Court reached an incorrect conclusion. This section will
also consider the possible implications of overturning the case completely
versus overturning the case in part.
1.

The Court’s Ruling Was Incorrect

Closer inspection of the City of Fayetteville decision reveals that the
Court’s reasoning was flawed. The Court incorrectly found that Amendment
74’s uniform rate was a tax levied by the state.123 This conclusion runs afoul
of another Arkansas constitutional provision: Amendment 47.124 Amendment 47 expressly prohibits the state from levying taxes on real property. 125
If Amendment 74 was actually a tax levied by the state, by the Court’s own
logic,126 there is no way it could be harmonized with Amendment 47. Interestingly, particularly in light of the important role that the doctrine of repeal
by implication played in the Court’s decision, the Court’s opinion made zero
mention of Amendment 47.127 The logical next step after determining that
Amendment 74 was a state tax would have been reconciling it with
122. Id.
123. City of Fayetteville v. Washington Cty., 369 Ark. 455, 462, 255 S.W.3d 844, 849
(noting the circuit court’s rationale that Amendment 74 was a tax passed by the voters rather
than a “local general property tax”).
124. ARK. CONST. amend. XLVII (“No ad valorem tax shall be levied upon property by
the State.”).
125. Id.
126. City of Fayetteville, 369 Ark. at 471, 255 S.W.3d at 855–56.
127. See City of Fayetteville, 369 Ark. 455, 255 S.W.3d 844.
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Amendment 47, and the Court’s refusal to broach the subject would seem to
indicate that the Court was not even confident that it characterized Amendment 74 correctly.
Even if Amendment 47 was not an issue, Amendment 74 should still be
characterized as a local tax. While certain provisions of Amendment 74
share characteristics with other state taxes,128 these are heavily outweighed
by provisions that indicate Amendment 74 is a tax levied by local school
districts.129 Perhaps most indicative of Amendment 74’s local character is
the fact that the amendment permits variation in funding as between school
districts.130
It should follow, having determined that Amendment 74 imposes a tax
levied by individual school districts, that Amendment 78 allows for
Amendment 74’s twenty-five mills to be utilized by TIF. The language of
Amendment 78 is clear. It provides that part or all of the ad valorem taxes in
a redevelopment district, levied “by any taxing unit,” may be used for redevelopment purposes.131 Even before Act 2231, Amendment 78’s enabling
legislation included school districts in the definition of “taxing unit.”132
While Amendment 78 does except certain debt service taxes from TIF, 133
Amendment 78 and its enabling legislation make no mention of Amendment
74’s uniform rate.
2.

Implications of Overturning City of Fayetteville

While overturning City of Fayetteville would accomplish the ultimate
goal—making TIF a viable option once more—the process would be highly
volatile and could result in unexpected (and unintended) consequences.
First, lower courts would need to ignore stare decisis in order to even get the
issue before the Arkansas Supreme Court again. Plus, even if the issue made
it before the court a second time, that court could decide to follow precedent
and TIF would be back to square one. Finally, if City of Fayetteville is overturned, that could mean that Amendment 74 is repealed.134
Concerning the potential repeal of Amendment 74, where the City of
Fayetteville court found no “invincible repugnancy” between Amendments
128. ARK. CONST. art. 14 § (b)(3) (providing that the 25 mills be remitted to the State
Treasurer after collection).
129. Id. (requiring all revenues to be returned back to the local school districts from
which they were received).
130. Id. § (a).
131. ARK. CONST. amend. LXXVIII, § 1(d).
132. The Arkansas Community Redevelopment Act of 2001, No. 1197, sec. 2(16), 2001
Ark. Acts 1197 (amended 2005).
133. ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-168-301(18)(b)(i).
134. See City of Fayetteville v. Washington Cty., 369 Ark. 455, 471, 255 S.W.3d 844,
855–56.

2020]

TAX INCREMENT FINANCING

627

74 and 78,135 an argument can be made that a different court could reach the
opposite conclusion. A court hearing the issue could point to the fact that the
legislature passed Act 2231 in response to Mike Beebe’s opinion letter as an
indicator that the two amendments are in conflict.136 Another indicator could
be that Amendment 78 expressly excludes certain mills from being used for
TIF purposes without mentioning Amendment 74’s uniform rate.137 The City
of Fayetteville court took this to mean that the drafters must have intended
to exclude the uniform rate from Amendment 78’s reach,138 but another
(more logical) interpretation could find that the drafters would have included the uniform rate among Amendment 78’s other exclusions had they intended to shield it from TIF. The legislature drafted Amendment 74 for the
purpose of channeling tax revenue to schools for “the sole purpose of
maintenance and operation.”139 If the purpose of Amendment 78 was to utilize some of that same revenue for redevelopment purposes, then revenue
would no longer be used for the “sole purpose” of school maintenance and
operation. Therefore, a court could reasonably find that the intents of
Amendments 74 and 78 are irreconcilable, thus repealing Amendment 74 by
implication.140
Repealing Amendment 74 entirely would confirm TIF critics’ worst
accusations. Not only would TIF be fully operational (siphoning dollars
away from the public good141), but local governments would no longer be
required to levy Amendment 74’s uniform rate. Left to their own devices,
cities, perhaps in an effort to lower property taxes, might vote to eliminate
all school maintenance mills. Before long, Arkansas could be dotted with
TIF-backed big box stores and dilapidated school buildings—the stuff of
nightmares for TIF naysayers touting “crony capitalism.” However, the aim
of this note is not to see funding wrested from a public-school system that so
desperately needs it. Ideally, City of Fayetteville would be overturned only
to the extent that it prohibits cities from utilizing Amendment 74’s uniform
rate for redevelopment purposes.

135. Id.
136. H.B. 2735, 85th Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2005).
137. ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-168-301(18)(b).
138. City of Fayetteville, 369 Ark. at 470, 255 S.W.3d at 855.
139. ARK. CONST. art. XIV.
140. See Chesshir v. Copeland, 182 Ark. 425, 32 S.W.2d 301, 302 (1930) (“[T]he
amendment, being the last expression of the Sovereign will of the people, will prevail as an
implied repeal to the extent of the conflict.”).
141. Crony Capitalism in Arkansas, supra note 65.
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A New TIF Amendment

While overturning City of Fayetteville could revitalize TIF, as discussed above, the process would be highly volatile and might not even end
in the desired result. A more stable and direct way of bringing TIF back is
by amending the Arkansas Constitution. This section offers several provisions that a new TIF amendment should include, drawing from both Act
2231 and the American Planning Association’s model TIF statutes.
1.

Don’t Reinvent the Wheel: Borrowing from Act 2231

Thankfully, the 85th General Assembly noticed many of the original
defects in Arkansas’s TIF legislation and sought to cure them by way of Act
2231.142 A number of these curative measures should be adopted and incorporated into a new TIF amendment. Specifically, drafters should be sure to
include the sections of Act 2231 that (1) limit the use of TIF on undeveloped
land,143 (2) impose stricter requirements on redevelopment project plans,144
and (3) provide for the termination of redevelopment districts within twentyfive years.145
a.

Limitations on undeveloped property

One major criticism levied against TIF is that, rather than being used as
a blight-fighting tool, it is used by affluent suburban areas to subsidize
growth where subsidizing is not needed.146 Worse still, TIF may be used to
finance projects on property that was never developed in the first place (as
opposed to “redevelopment”). The Arkansas legislature sought to prevent
the misuse of TIF in this way, not only by refining the criteria for a “blighted area,” but also by adding a section that deals with undeveloped land specifically.147 This section, codified in Title 14 of the Arkansas Code, requires
the TIF ordinance adopted by the local governing body to include findings
as to “whether the property located in the proposed redevelopment district is
in a wholly unimproved condition or whether [it] contains existing improvements.”148 Undeveloped land does not preclude the formation of a re142. See Act of Apr. 15, 2005, No. 2231, 2005 Ark. Acts 2231 (codified at ARK. CODE
ANN. §§ 14-168-301 to -324 (2018)).
143. Id. sec. 2.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See George Lefcoe, Competing for the Next Hundred Million Americans: The Uses
and Abuses of Tax Increment Financing, 43 URB. LAW. 427 (2011).
147. See 2005 Ark. Acts 2231 supra note 142, at sec. 2.
148. ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-168-305(c)(5).
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development district, but “[v]acant or unimproved parcels” must be “substantially impairing or arresting” an area that is developed.149 If the property
in the redevelopment district is found to be “in a wholly unimproved condition,” then any incremental revenue the district brings in “shall only be used
for project costs incurred in connection with capital improvements of a public nature.”150 Such improvements include “any physical public betterment[s].”151 In other words, a city cannot use TIF revenue to subsidize a
developer’s improvements on completely unimproved land unless those
improvements would also be beneficial to the public (i.e. sewer lines, water
lines, streets, etc.).
b.

Project plan requirements

One of the biggest risks to TIF is that it only works if property values
rise because of the redevelopment project itself.152 If property values in the
redevelopment district would have risen on their own, then TIF actually
does cut into the local government’s general revenue and deprives other
taxing units of their due.153 Therefore, it is imperative that a city and developer are confident that their plan will produce enough incremental revenue
to finance the project. To that end, the 85th General Assembly imposed
stricter requirements on project plans with the approval of Act 2231.154
When Amendment 78 was originally implemented, with the exception
of a few general requirements, a redevelopment project plan only needed to
include an “economic feasibility study.”155 Act 1197 provided no guidance
for what these feasibility studies should include, who should conduct them,
etc. Act 2231 did away with the “economic feasibility study,” replacing it
with a detailed procedure for conducting a cost-benefit analysis of the proposed redevelopment district. The new procedure required an independent
third-party to analyze “the projected tax impact, if any, to taxing units as a
result of the creation of a redevelopment district.”156 The analysis must
compare the projected incremental revenue captured by the redevelopment
district with “all projected sales, income, and ad valorem taxes received by

149. Id. § 14-168-305(d)(4).
150. Id. § 14-168-305(f)(3).
151. Id. § 14-169-303(a)(2).
152. See AMERICAN PLANNING ASSOCIATION, GROWING SMART LEGISLATIVE GUIDEBOOK
14–62 (Stuart Meck ed., 2002) [hereinafter “GUIDEBOOK”].
153. Id.
154. Act of Apr. 15, 2005, No. 2231, 2005 Ark. Acts 2231 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN.
§§ 14-168-301 to -324 (2018)).
155. The Arkansas Community Redevelopment Act of 2001, No. 1197, sec. 7, 2001 Ark.
Acts 1197 (current version codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 14-168-301 to -324 (2018)).
156. ARK CODE ANN. § 14-168-306(b)(2)(A).
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taxing units . . . as a result of the creation of the redevelopment district.”157
The economic analysis must then be submitted to the Arkansas Department
of Economic Development and it must provide feedback to the local governing body within a month.158 This procedure improves the accuracy with
which a city can predict whether a redevelopment district will be successful
and has the added benefit of building in another level of accountability.
c.

Twenty-five-year limit

Originally, under Act 1197, redevelopment districts could theoretically
last forever.159 Act 1197 limited their existence to twenty-five years, but a
city could unilaterally amend the redevelopment project plan to issue additional bonds with a maturity date extending beyond that twenty-five-year
mark.160 Allowing redevelopment districts to last indefinitely, particularly in
light of Act 1197’s other defects, posed a serious problem. For example,
suppose that a city establishes a redevelopment district in a certain area, but
property values do not increase (perhaps the city’s “economic feasibility
study” was lacking). Because property values have not risen, the district is
producing no tax increment and no funds are available to finance the necessary improvements. A stubborn city could, in hopes that those property values eventually go up, amend the project plan in perpetuity. If property values did eventually increase, some factor other than the redevelopment district would probably be responsible. Then other taxing units within the district would be deprived of the increased tax revenue.161 The 85th General
Assembly eliminated this possibility by stripping cities of their ability to
unilaterally issue additional bonds and extend the life of the district.162 Under Act 2231, “no redevelopment district may be in existence for a period
longer than twenty-five (25) years.”163
2.

The APA’s Model TIF Statutes

Aside from borrowing from previous TIF legislation within Arkansas,
drafters of a new TIF amendment should also look to the model TIF statutes
promulgated by the American Planning Association. In 2002, the American
Planning Association (APA) published the Growing Smart Legislative
157. Id. § 14-168-306(b)(2)(B).
158. Id. § 14-168-306(b)(2)(C).
159. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 14-168-301 to -324.
160. Id.
161. See GUIDEBOOK, supra note 152, at 14–52.
162. Act of Apr. 15, 2005, No. 2231, 2005 Ark. Acts 2231 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN.
§§ 14-168-301 to -324 (2018)).
163. Id.
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Guidebook in an effort to synthesize and make available a set of uniform
guidelines for effective city planning.164 The guidebook includes an entire
chapter dedicated to tax relief programs, as well as model TIF statutes.165
The APA’s model statute is particularly beneficial in that it is an amalgam
of TIF statutes from across the country, drawing from those that have seen
success as well as tweaking those that the APA determined were lacking.166
The Arkansas TIF statutes and the model statutes converge on a number of
issues, like whether or not TIF can utilize revenue collected from new ad
valorem taxes, imposed after the formation of a redevelopment district (it
cannot).167 However, the APA’s model statutes include two provisions not
shared by current Arkansas TIF law that drafters would be wise to adopt.
First, Arkansas should require that a redevelopment project plan be approved before a city can propose or create a redevelopment district. Second,
Arkansas should adopt a “but-for” test that the project plan must satisfy.
a.

Project plan approval

One of the APA’s goals in synthesizing a model TIF statute was that
“tax increment financing [be] intrinsically linked to the broader redevelopment program it is intended to finance.”168 To that end, the model statute
requires that a project plan be drawn and approved before a city passes a
TIF ordinance.169 This may seem like a relatively insignificant procedural
requirement, but it becomes important in light of a different procedural requirement found in the Arkansas statutes.
The Arkansas TIF statutes require a city to hold a public hearing prior
to creating a redevelopment district.170 Interested parties may attend the
hearing to learn more about the proposed district, express their own views,
ask questions, air grievances, etc. However, aside from the general purpose
of the redevelopment district and its proposed boundaries, the hearing attendees almost certainly do not learn much. This is because, under current
Arkansas TIF procedure, the city is not required to review and approve a
redevelopment project plan until after a redevelopment district is formed.171
The relevant section states that “[u]pon creation of the redevelopment district, the local governing body shall cause the preparation of a project plan
for each redevelopment district, and the project plan shall be adopted by
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

GUIDEBOOK, supra note 152, at 14–37.
Id. at 14–38 to 14–51.
Id. at xli.
Id. at 14–56; ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-168-301(18)(B)(i).
GUIDEBOOK, supra note 152, at 14–55.
Id. at 14–58.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-168-305(b)(1).
Id. § 14-168-306(a).
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ordinance of the local governing body.”172 Under this procedure, a governing body proposes a redevelopment district, a public hearing is held regarding the district, and only then is the governing body required to put together
a project plan. What good is a public hearing if the answers to the attendees’
questions do not even exist yet? The Arkansas statutes do provide that additional public hearings must be held before the project plan is enacted (and
each time the project plan is amended),173 but a more reasonable procedure
would require the city to have a project plan drafted before taking the idea to
the public in the first place. The statute does impose a number of important
and beneficial requirements on the project plan itself,174 but drafters should
reverse the order so that the public has an opportunity to scrutinize that plan.
b.

The “but-for” test

TIF can be a major gamble, as previously discussed,175 but the model
statutes’ most valuable provision acts to mitigate some of the risk.176 Section
14-302(4)(b) of the model statutes precludes the adoption of a TIF ordinance
unless “redevelopment would not occur in the redevelopment area without
employing redevelopment assistance tools as described in the redevelopment area plan” and the project plan “could not be implemented without tax
increment financing.”177 This provision establishes a two-pronged “but-for”
test that a redevelopment project plan must pass before a city can establish a
redevelopment district. First, a city must show that an area could not be redeveloped without the proffered project plan. If the first prong is satisfied,
then the city must show that the project plan would fail without TIF. Put
another way, a city must show that the redevelopment efforts would produce
a positive tax increment (due to rising property values) and that the redevelopment efforts would not be possible “but-for” the very tax increment they
produce.
The Arkansas TIF statutes contain a similar provision, but it is much
less stringent. That provision states that a city must adopt a TIF ordinance
that “contains findings that the real property within the redevelopment district will be benefitted by” the redevelopment efforts.178 While this provision
runs in the same vein as the APA’s “but-for” test, its requirements are far
looser. Drafters of a new Arkansas TIF amendment should include the “butfor” test so as to avoid implementing TIF where it is not actually needed,
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. § 14-168-306(b).
Id. §§ 14-168-306(b)–(c).
GUIDEBOOK, supra note 152, at 14–52.
Id. at 14–58.
Id.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-168-305.
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thus depriving local taxing units (usually school districts) of revenue they
would have otherwise received.
VII. CONCLUSION
TIF used to be a mutually beneficial tool for Arkansas cities and developers alike. Unfortunately, TIF remains effectively useless in this state following the City of Fayetteville decision. Within the context of real estate
transactions, TIF’s disappearance leaves virtually no government assistance
available, whether sought by a city in its redevelopment efforts, a local
business wishing to reduce overhead, or an out-of-state company considering Arkansas for relocation. From any of these perspectives, reviving TIF is
a necessary step toward making Arkansas nationally competitive.
TIF’s revitalization can be accomplished in at least two ways. First,
having shown its flawed reasoning, City of Fayetteville can and should be
overturned to the extent that it prohibits TIF from utilizing Amendment 74’s
uniform rate. However, considering the volatility of the Arkansas court system and the possible adverse consequences of overturning that case, amending the Arkansas Constitution is a better plan for revitalizing TIF in the
state. Drafters of a new Arkansas TIF amendment should reincorporate certain curative provisions from Act 2231 and should supplement those with
portions of the APA’s model TIF statutes. A new, well-drafted TIF amendment will cure many of TIF’s alleged defects and extinguish many of its
criticisms. Whether by way of the courts or by way of the legislature, the
powers that be should not delay in getting TIF revitalization efforts off the
ground. In a state without much going for it economically, TIF renewal will
play an important role in Arkansas reaching economic vitality.
Tucker M. Brackins*

*

Tucker Brackins is a third-year student at the University of Arkansas at Little Rock William
H. Bowen School of Law. I would like to thank the student editors of the University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review for selecting my note for publication. I also give special
thanks to Professor Lynn Foster of the Bowen School of Law and to Mr. J. Cliff McKinney
for their support and assistance throughout the research and note writing process. Most of all,
thank you to my wife, Lillian, for putting up with the many hours we spent apart and my
general neurosis throughout.

